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HUMAN RIGHTS HISTORIES+ 
Christopher McCrudden∗ 
Abstract - This review article considers Samuel Moyn’s book The Last Utopia: Human Rights 
in History in the context of recent trends in the writing of human rights history. A central 
debate among historians of human rights, in seeking to account for the genesis and spread of 
human rights, is how far current human rights practice demonstrates continuity or radical 
discontinuity with previous attempts to secure rights. Moyn’s discontinuity thesis and the 
controversy surrounding it exemplify this debate. Whether Moyn is correct is important 
beyond the confines of human rights historiography, with implications for their meaning in 
law, as well as their political legitimacy. This review argues that Moyn’s book ultimately fails 
to convince, for two broad reasons. First, a more balanced judgment would conclude that the 
history of human rights is both one of continuity and discontinuity. Second, and more 
importantly, Moyn fails to offer a convincing account of the normativity of human rights. 
Undertaking a history of human rights requires a deeper engagement with debates on the 
nature and validity of human rights than Moyn seems prepared to contemplate.  
Keywords: human rights, human dignity, constitutional rights, international human rights, 
legal history 
1. Introduction
The history of human rights is a relatively new scholarly discipline, although one that 
is rapidly expanding.1 Recent debates within the discipline have tended to focus on 
identifying the sources of human rights. There are various contenders, each with 
different proponents. Are the roots of human rights in Stoicism, or do human rights 
date from the Renaissance and the Reformation?2 Does human rights discourse have 
                                                      
+ A review of Samuel Moyn, The Last Utopia: Human Rights in History (Belknap 
Press, hb 2010; reprint ed. pb, 2012). 
∗ Fellow of the British Academy; Professor of Human Rights and Equality Law, 
Queen’s University Belfast; William W Cook Global Professor of Law, University of 
Michigan Law School, email: chris.mccrudden@qub,ac.uk. Versions were presented to the 
University of Michigan Conference on Law and Human Rights in Global History, March 20th 
2012, to the Michigan Law School Legal Theory Workshop, and at the Straus Institute for the 
Advanced Study of Law and Justice, NYU School of Law, where I was a Fellow during 2013-
14. I am particularly grateful to Philip Alston, Ananda Burra, Adam Etinson, Jeff Flynn, Don
Herzog, Hans Joas, Mattias Mahlmann, Samuel Moyn, Richard Primus, Joseph Raz, Rebecca 
Scott, John Tasioulas and two anonymous referees for their helpful comments on earlier 
drafts, and to the Leverhulme Foundation for appointing me to a Major Research Fellowship 
(2011-14), without which this would not have been written. 
1 See Samuel Moyn, ‘Substance, Scale, and Salience: The Recent Historiography of 
Human Rights’ (2012) 8 Annual Review of Law and Social Science 123 (hereafter “Moyn, 
Recent Historiography’), 124: ‘Scarcely a decade ago, the field [of human rights history] did 
not exist at all.’ 
2 John M. Headley, The Europeanization of the World: On the Origins of Human 
Rights and Democracy (Princeton University Press, 2007), 67-69. 
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its origins in the idea of natural rights in the Middle Ages, with the canonists and 
Roman law to the fore?3 Is the Enlightenment, culminating in the French and 
American Revolutions of the late eighteenth century, the critical period,4 or does our 
understanding of human rights have its origins in the abolition of the slave trade,5 or 
in humanitarian interventions in the latter half of the 19th Century?6 Or is its 
development an even more modern idea, emphasizing the 1940s and the development 
of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948?7 In The Last Utopia: Human 
Rights in History,8 Samuel Moyn, an American historian at Columbia University, 
rejecting all of these explanations, sees developments in the decade of the 1970s as 
marking the emergence of what we now consider ‘human rights’, constituting a 
significant break from past understandings. 
The history of human rights is now one of the most contested and interesting 
areas of human rights scholarship. For Philip Alston, ‘there is a struggle for the soul 
of the human rights movement, and it is being waged in large part through the proxy 
of genealogy’.9 That may be an exaggeration (there is also an important debate in 
political philosophy which might be described in much the same terms, as we shall 
see), but Alston is right to point to the importance of the historiographical debate for 
those interested in human rights more broadly.  
Many issues swirl around in these recent debates about the origins of human 
rights. The principal debate at the moment is between continuity and rupture: to what 
extent is our understanding of human rights a reflection of past uses or is it something 
new, representing a radical break from these past uses?  In this debate, Moyn is firmly 
in the discontinuity camp. Moyn resists the notion, which he finds in ‘orthodox’ 
                                                      
3 Contrast Michel Villey, Critique de la Pensée Juridique Moderne (first published 
1976, Dalloz, 2009) with Brian Tierney, The Idea of Natural Rights (Scholars Press, 1997). 
4 Lynn Hunt, Inventing Human Rights: A History (Penguin, 2008) (hereafter ‘Hunt, 
Inventing Human Rights’), 64-65. 
5 Jenny Martinez, The Slave Trade and the Origins of International Human Rights 
Law (OUP, 2012) (hereafter ‘Martinez, Slave Trade). 
6 Gary Bass, Freedom’s Battle: The Origins of Humanitarian Intervention (Knopf, 
2008). 
7 Mary Ann Glendon, A World Made New (Harvard University Press, 2001); 
Johannes Marsink, The Universal Declaration of Human Rights: Origins, Drafting and Intent 
(University of Pennsylvania Press, 2000) 
8 Samuel Moyn, The Last Utopia: Human Rights in History (Belknap Press, 2010) 
(hereinafter referred to as ‘Moyn’). 
9 Philip Alston, ‘Does the Past Matter? On the Origins of Human Rights’ (2013) 126 
Harvard Law Review 2043, 2077. 
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histories of human rights, that the development of human rights should be seen as 
linear. In particular, he argues that it is mistaken to see the development of human 
rights in the late twentieth century as inevitable, resisting a teleological explanation, 
and pointing to the many contingencies and choices that arose along the way when a 
different road could have been taken. In Part 2, Moyn’s argument is set out and 
contrasted with ‘orthodox’ human rights historical accounts. 
Moyn’s book is refreshingly written, iconoclastic, passionate in advancing its 
arguments, rightly critical of many past histories of human rights, and provocative.  
Moyn’s work is also an influential contribution to debates about the nature of human 
rights within the discipline of history and the social sciences.10 Several scholars of 
history have regarded it as a ‘must read’ for those who are concerned to understand 
the genesis of human rights.11 Moyn’s book has also attracted the attention of legal 
scholars, some of whom have tended to be broadly sympathetic to the thrust of his 
argument.12 The book has also resulted in at least one colloquium, in which Moyn has 
responded to critics.13 
In this review article I argue that, even with Moyn’s subsequent clarification, 
The Last Utopia ultimately fails to convince, for two broad reasons. First, a more 
balanced judgment would conclude that the history of human rights is both one of 
continuity and discontinuity; second, undertaking a history of human rights is an 
enterprise that requires a deeper engagement with debates on the nature and validity 
of human rights than Moyn seems prepared to contemplate.  
                                                      
10 ibid 2045. 
11 See, e.g. Devin O Pendas, ‘Towards a New Politics? On the Recent Historiography 
of Human Rights’ (2012) 21 Contemporary European History, 95, 104 (‘the indispensible 
starting point for any discussion of the history of human rights for many years to come’); 
William Scheuerman, (2011) 9(1) Perspectives on Politics 170 (hereafter ‘Scheuerman’) 
(‘incisive and sometimes brilliant’); Francesca Klug, (2012) 3(1) Global Policy 119 (hereafter 
‘Klug, Global Policy’), 120 (‘compelling and original’); John Gray, ‘What Rawls Hath 
Wrought’ National Interest, January/February 2011, available at < 
http://nationalinterest.org/bookreview/what-rawls-hath-wrought-4570>, (last accessed April 
25, 2014) (‘brilliantly illuminating’, ‘seminal study’). 
12 E.g. as detailed by Justin Zaremby, ‘On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for 
Human Rights Law’ (2012) 15(1) Yale Human Rights and Development Law Journal 155, 
158. 
13 The colloquium is in (2013) 22(1) Qui Parle: Critical Humanities and the Social 
Sciences, with articles by Pheng Cheah, at 56, Antony Anghie, at 63, and Seyla Benhabib, at 
81. Moyn’s response, ‘The Continuing Perplexities of Human Rights’ (hereafter ‘Moyn,
Perplexities’), is at 96. Thanks to Ananda Burra for this reference. 
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These criticisms are set out in Parts 3 and 4 respectively. In Part 3, it is argued 
that the ‘continuity versus discontinuity’ debate presents us with a false dichotomy. 
Although Moyn is correct to identify several important discontinuities, he 
underestimates several important continuities. He underestimates the role of dignity in 
human rights practice (past and present); he underestimates the universal character of 
‘constitutional’ and revolutionary, rights; he underestimates the primary importance 
of domestic actors and mechanisms in the current practice of international human 
rights; and he underestimates the continuity of human rights borrowing as a prime 
methodology of how human rights is diffused.  
In Part 4, it is argued that Moyn’s greatest failure lies in the absence of any 
convincing account of the normative power that human rights appear to possess. 
Human rights history-writing of the kind exemplified by Moyn’s book 
problematically separates questions to do with the origin and diffusion of human 
rights from questions to do with their nature and validity. The answer to why human 
rights became so important lies in part in their normativity. Efforts to locate the 
origins and explain the trajectory of human rights  (to write a history of human rights, 
in other words) need the orientation that comes from engagement with debates 
about what human rights are, and how we are to understand their normative force. 
Historical and philosophical inquiry are inseparable in this regard.  
Part 5, concluding, seeks to explain why the debate is important beyond the 
confines of human rights historiography, considering en passant Moyn’s recent 
defence of The Last Utopia against criticisms similar to those made in this review. 
2. Competing Human Rights Narratives
It will be useful to begin by contrasting two competing human rights’ narratives. The 
first I shall term the ‘orthodox’ narrative.  The second, which sums up the main 
elements of Moyn’s argument in The Last Utopia, is appropriately termed a 
‘revisionist’ narrative, because its aim is to present an account that challenges what 
Moyn considers to be the previously dominant (or ‘orthodox’) narrative.14 Whether 
                                                      
14 Moyn is not alone. See, e.g., Stefan-Ludwig Hoffmann (ed), Human Rights in the 
Twentieth Century (Cambridge University Press, 2010) (hereafter ‘Hoffmann’), and a recent 
symposium on human rights in (2013) 4(2) Humanity: An International Journal of Human 
Rights, Humanitarianism, and Development 183-288. 
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any historian actually presents precisely such a narrative is beside the point;15 what 
Moyn is reacting against is a narrative, which he considers to be prevalent, and which 
he considers to be flawed. Having a sense of what this ‘orthodox’ historical narrative 
consists in will help us understand how Moyn understands his project. 
 
A. The Orthodox Narrative: Human Rights’ Foundation Myth 
 
The bare bones of an ‘orthodox’ narrative (‘foundation myth’ would be another term) 
might look something like this: in the beginning was the Enlightenment which led to 
the American and French Revolutions, which led in turn to the adoption of human 
rights as a necessary part of modernity. Human rights in the Enlightenment had 
important antecedents in the idea of natural rights in continental Europe and in 
English constitutional history, but the French and American Revolutions tore the idea 
of natural rights away from its religious, metaphysical, and local roots.  Instead 
reason, or even Reason, came to be the basis on which a rational, universalized idea of 
human rights came to be established and spread.  
Several of the most prominent social movements in the 19th Century were based 
on this idea of human rights, and the diffusion of human rights during the 19th 
Century in Europe and beyond culminated in the adoption of human rights after the 
horrors of the Second World War in a set of internationally-binding, legal instruments 
which increasingly came to be recognized throughout the world as a basis for how 
states should behave internally towards both their own citizens as well as externally 
towards others. Those supporting human rights were a broad coalition of states and 
civil society groups, including religious groups. Their agreement was influenced in 
particular by the increasing recognition of the Holocaust, rather than because of any 
particularly well-formed theoretical consensus on philosophical premises, beyond the 
universalistic idea that the human person should be protected from such horrors 
simply in virtue of their humanity, an idea that came to be particularly associated with 
the concept of ‘human dignity’. Not surprisingly, therefore, the scope of what we 
                                                      
15 Jenny S Martinez, ‘Human Rights and History’ (2012) 126 Harvard Law Review 
Forum 221 (hereafter ‘Martinez, Human Rights and History’), 237: ‘in a certain sense, Moyn 
is taking aim at a strawman. No serious scholar subscribes to a narrative of inevitable 
progress, in which all the streams of the past converge in a mighty river of human rights 
triumphalism.’ 
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consider to be protected as human rights will expand, as we develop a greater 
understanding of what it means to be human. The progress of the human rights idea 
has not, however, been matched by the implementation of human rights in practice, 
and this is the principal concern on which those who support the idea should now 
focus.  
 
B. A ‘Revisionist’ Foundation Myth 
 
 
Moyn’s book is an example of the ‘discontinuity school’ of human rights history that 
has emerged since 2000. This school emphasizes the 1970s as marking a decisive shift 
in the development of human rights theory and practice, rather than any previous 
period. There are several elements in Moyn’s argument that need to be disaggregated. 
The following sets out the gist of his argument.  
It is necessary, first, to distinguish between international protection of human 
rights and the protection of rights at the domestic level, and thus between international 
law and domestic law. Previous regimes of rights, such as those that flowered in the 
19th Century, had certain common characteristics that distinguish them from the ‘new’ 
human rights that came to fruition in the 1970s. In previous periods, rights were ‘part 
of the authority of the state, not invoked to transcend it.’16 These rights ‘only appeared 
through the state, and there was no forum above it, or even at times in it, in which to 
indict the state’s transgressions’.17 ‘[R]ights were to be achieved through the 
construction of spaces of citizenship in which rights were accorded and protected.’18 
‘In a sense, every declaration of rights at the time (and until recently) was implicitly 
what the French openly labeled theirs: a declaration of the rights of man and 
citizen.’19 They therefore had local meaning rather than universalistic meaning. They 
were ‘deeply bound up with the construction, through revolution if necessary, of state 
and nation.’20 ‘The ‘rights of man’ were about a whole people incorporating itself in a 
state’.21 States and nations ‘became the formative crucible of rights, and their 
                                                      
16 Moyn (n 8) 6. 
17 ibid 26. 
18 ibid 13. 
19 ibid 25-26 (emphasis in original). 
20 ibid 20. 
21 ibid 26. 
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indispensable ally and forum’22 ‘[T]he main remedy for the abrogation of 
revolutionary rights remained democratic action up to and including another 
revolution.’23 Rights ‘mainly provided for citizen mobilization not judicial action.’24 
These rights did not provide a ‘rationale for foreign or “human” claims against 
states.’25 ‘[I]n the nineteenth century the often heartfelt appeal to the rights of man 
always went along with the propagation of national sovereignty as indispensable 
means, entailed precondition, and enduring accompaniment.’26  
For Moyn, the ‘severe interruption in the historical trajectory of the rights of 
man between the age of revolution and the founding of the United Nations is always 
omitted from attempts to reconstruct their history as one of uplift because it is an 
episode that simply will not fit.’27 There was an exception to this decline of the rights 
of man: the development of ‘another rights tradition between revolutionary rights and 
human rights …: civil liberties.’28 However, civil liberties were ‘as different from 
each of them as they were from one another.’ Like ‘revolutionary-era rights, civil 
liberties drew their ideological authority and cultural premises from the nation-state. 
All of these groups rooted their claims not in universal law but in allegedly deep 
national traditions of freedom.’29 Moyn recognizes that ‘[c]ivil libertarians were part 
of a common phenomenon that sprouted in different places around the same time, and 
they were frequently internationalist in their sentiments’, but ‘they were enough the 
inheritors of revolutionary-era rights to overwhelmingly restrict not simply their 
rhetorical appeals to national values but their activism to the domestic forum … civil 
libertarians mostly gazed within.’30 He seeks, but fails to find ‘when and why rights 
incorporated any sort of impulse beyond the nation-state’.31 
Although the campaign against the slave trade and slavery at home is a 
possible candidate, it was one among a number of nineteenth century causes that were 
                                                      
22 ibid 23. 
23 ibid 27. 
24 ibid 32. 
25 ibid 27. 
26 ibid 29. 
27 ibid 36. 
28 ibid 37. 
29 ibid 38. 
30 ibid 38. 
31 ibid 36. 
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‘almost never framed as rights issues’.32 Rather, they were the occasion for 
‘compassionate aid’.33 Treaty-based protection of minorities in the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries did not provide ‘direct international assurance of individual rights’ 
but were ‘conceived as group based’.34 ‘[P]roperty protections remained by far the 
most persistent and important rights claim in theory and law (including constitutional 
law) throughout the nineteenth century and modern history’.35 In the early twentieth 
century, campaigns in the League of Nations against slavery and forced labour, and 
trafficking in women and children were ‘culturally specific and politically selective 
campaigns’36.  They were not ‘conceptualized around notions of universal rights, and 
were typically philanthropic causes deployed in a hierarchical world to beat back the 
illicit practices of foreign peoples, religions, and empires cast as brutal and 
uncivilized.’37 Later in the twentieth century, anti-colonialism focused on national 
liberation and collective economic development, not classical liberties or social rights.  
The post Second World War ‘wave of rights in the constitutions of the new 
states [was] sometimes directly influenced by the Universal Declaration’s catalogue,’ 
but ‘no immediate postwar rights revolution, in which the history of the constitutions 
and the history of international human rights were deeply intertwined and drew 
authority from each other, took place.’38 The new constitutions, such as that in India, 
focused on ‘domestic protection of rights, according to traditions of state 
citizenship.’39  
‘The main purpose of these constitutions … was the constitution of sovereignty. (…) 
The confluence between an earlier tradition of declaring rights and post-colonial 
constitution-making … persuasively illustrates the persisting national framework for 
rights that defined the modern history of the subject … [This] worked as much to 
ward off as to prepare the legalization of rights on the international scene.  In 
particular, there is no sense in which these postcolonial constitutional rights interfered 
with hard-won sovereignty from without.’40 
                                                      
32 ibid 33. 
33 ibid 33. 
34 ibid 33. 
35 ibid 35. 
36 ibid 72. 
37 ibid 72. 
38 ibid 111. 
39 ibid 112. 
40 ibid 113. 
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Moyn argues that human rights, properly so-called, concern the protections 
that individuals receive at the international level.41 The rights involved are individual 
rights, not collective rights. Human rights protections concentrate on ‘classical 
liberties’ and not collective economic development. The protections accorded protect 
rights; they are not simply attempts to further ‘philanthropic causes.’42 The idea of 
human rights also implies ‘an agenda for improving the world, and bringing about a 
new one in which the dignity of each individual will enjoy secure international 
protection.’ This international protection is achieved through the authority of 
‘international law’, and does not rely on state authorization or enforcement.43 The 
norms in play constitute ‘superordinate rules to which [states] must defer.’44 They 
‘transcend [the] state forum for rights’.45 Human rights ‘as an idea and a practice’ 
‘set[s] itself against’ the idea of states and nations as ‘the formative crucible of rights, 
and their indispensable ally and forum’.46 The rights are ‘universalistic’.47 They imply 
‘a politics of suffering abroad,’48 rather than one that focuses internally in a particular 
state.  
It was only in the decade after 1968, according to Moyn, that human rights in 
this sense became embedded in people’s consciousness and in their consciences. The 
most important institutional manifestation that was both the cause and effect of these 
developments was the growth of international or transnational social movements 
revolving around individual rights, creating a ‘popular language of international 
human rights on the ground.’49 Most importantly, and central to Moyn’s general thesis 
about the growth of human rights, is that the idea of human rights as a minimalist 
utopian project succeeded because it filled a vacuum left after the collapse of previous 
universalistic, utopian movements, including Christianity, socialism, and anti-
colonialism. 
                                                      
41 ibid 1. 
42 ibid 72. 
43 ibid 1. See also ibid 3: ‘an international law of human rights as the steward of 
utopian norms, and as the mechanism of their fulfillment.’ 
44 ibid 111. 
45 ibid 20. 
46 ibid 23. 
47 ibid 7. 
48 ibid 12. 
49 ibid 66. 
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Moyn insistently tells his readers that the term ‘human rights’ was invented in 
the 1970s or, more precisely still, in 1977. The 1970s, he asserts, marked a sea change 
in our understanding of human rights, both conceptually and as practiced. It is the 
coming into existence of Amnesty International in 1961, its adoption of a minimalist 
human rights agenda based on the international legal protection of individuals outside 
one’s own country, its development (together with other non-governmental 
organizations) of an ‘anti-politics’ of human rights, its creation of a mass movement 
of engaged individuals, and its transcendence of past causes and ideologies, ‘severing 
obvious links to the immediate postwar framework’, that characterize the ‘new’ 
human rights.50 For Moyn, Amnesty International, and President Jimmy Carter’s 
adoption of an ethical foreign policy based on securing human rights, brought into 
existence the human rights ideal that would become, as Moyn has subsequently put it, 
‘hegemonic’.51  
 
3. A Critique of Moyn’s Discontinuity Thesis  
 
In this section of the review article, I turn to consider Moyn’s approach more 
critically.  I argue that the ‘continuity versus discontinuity’ debate presents us with a 
false dichotomy. Although Moyn is correct to identify several important 
discontinuities, he underestimates several critically important continuities. He 
underestimates the role of dignity in human rights practice (past and present); he 
underestimates the universal character of ‘constitutional’ and revolutionary, rights; he 
underestimates the primary importance of domestic actors and mechanisms in the 
current practice of international human rights; and he underestimates the continuity of 
human rights borrowing as a prime methodology of how human rights is diffused.  
 
A. Moyn’s Utopia  
 
We need to begin, however, with a brief consideration of Moyn’s argument that the 
human rights project ‘is a recognizably utopian program: for the political standards it 
champions and the emotional passion it inspires, this program draws on the image of a 
                                                      
50 ibid 131. 
51 Moyn, Perplexities (n 13), 110. 
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place that has not yet been called into being.’52 John Gray has suggested that it is 
unclear which sense of utopianism Moyn adopts. Gray distinguishes between two 
different senses: a utopian project that aims to bring about a different society than 
exists at the moment, but is nevertheless achievable, such as the abolition of slavery in 
the 19th Century; and an alternative project which is such that ‘it can be known in 
advance that its central objectives cannot be realized … [either] because these aims 
are impossible in any human society, or because they cannot be achieved in particular 
communities in any future that can reasonably be anticipated.’53  
Beyond describing human rights as ‘utopian’, however, Moyn is not 
forthcoming about his own theoretical perspectives, and seems particularly 
unreflective as regards the preconceptions about the nature of the concept of human 
rights that he brings to his project. In his (relatively few) references to current human 
rights theory, he skates over the finely grained distinctions currently entertained by 
philosophers. These might be entirely forgivable limitations in an historical essay of a 
purely narrative variety, were it not for the fact that we have seen that there are 
elements in his description that already hint at an underlying philosophy of human 
rights.  Indeed, from a close reading of the book, a relatively clear philosophy 
emerges, although it must be conceded that there is a significant degree of 
reconstruction necessary in order to formulate the elements of his theory. 
Moyn’s (implied rather than articulated) philosophical understanding of 
human rights is essentially this: The human rights project consists of a utopian and 
moralistic movement seeking to advance a set of minimalist standards, the aim of 
which is to secure the advancement of human dignity. The human rights project seeks 
to achieve this through essentially international, anti-political, non-programmatic 
activity, transcending the nation state as the central source and guarantor of a set of 
rights, which are global, legally enforceable, and framed in universalistic terms. 
Based on this, Moyn’s thesis appears to depend on an understanding of human 
rights as utopian in the first of Gray’s two senses. Moyn refers to the ‘minimalism’ of 
human rights as central to its success in the 1970s.54 The minimal nature of human 
rights, according to Moyn, has to do with their representing a set of limited standards 
                                                      
52 Moyn (n 8) 1 (emphasis added). 
53 Gray (n 11). 
54 Moyn (n 8) 135, 148, 172, 221, 223, 226. 
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for political conduct on the part of the state, rather than a complete or rich social ideal 
(such as nationalism or socialism) that would require massive social upheaval. We 
know that Moyn’s minimalist approach to human rights would exclude a right to 
development, and a right to self-determination, and probably (although not so clearly) 
socio-economic rights; it would also not seek to be programmatic or to set out a 
comprehensive political agenda. Moyn’s minimalist approach focuses primarily on 
particular civil and political rights, and on preventing genocide.  
 
B. Moyn and Human Dignity 
 
There is a significant debate in the current philosophical literature as to whether any 
foundational principle is necessary in order to provide a full description of these or 
any other list of human rights.55 This is not the place to debate that question. My point 
here is that, whether or not a foundational principle is necessary, Moyn appears in 
practice to identify such a principle as central to his thick description. That is, he 
appears (at least on one reading of the book) to indicate that there is a way of 
identifying the appropriate core of human rights minimalism on the basis of a meta-
principle underpinning the minimal.  
Furthermore, he appears (on this reading of his book) to consider that the best 
candidate for such a meta-principle is the concept of ‘human dignity.’ A persistent 
aspect of his narrative depends on there being a foundational principle of some sort. 
In his Prologue, Moyn identifies what he considers ‘people’ think about when they 
hear the phrase ‘human rights’. We have already seen that the phrase implies, for 
Moyn, ‘an agenda for improving the world, and bringing about a new one in which 
the dignity of each individual will enjoy secure international protection.’56 A little 
later he writes that: ‘There is no way to reckon with the recent emergence and 
contemporary power of human rights without focusing on their utopian dimension: 
the image of another, better world of dignity and respect that underlies their appeal.’57 
Moyn recognizes that the rights included in the UDHR were based ‘on the foundation 
                                                      
55 John Tasioulas, ‘Human Dignity and the Foundations of Human Rights’ in 
Christopher McCrudden (ed), Understanding Human Dignity (Proceedings of the British 
Academy 192, Oxford University Press for the British Academy, 2013) (hereinafter 
McCrudden, Understanding Human Dignity) 291. 
56 Moyn (n 8) 1 (emphasis added). 
57 ibid 4 (emphasis added).  
  
 
 
13 
of human dignity,’58 and at several points either he (or others whom he quotes) uses 
the term in this foundational sense. ‘Dignity’ features fourteen times in various 
formulations throughout the book, by itself, or as ‘human dignity’, or as ‘personal 
dignity,’ in each place as a meta-principle that unpins human rights and not simply as 
another term to describe ‘human rights’.59 Indeed, several of the key individuals that 
Moyn identifies as central to the ‘break though’ of human rights in the 1970s in the 
United States, appear at that time to have adopted the concept of ‘human dignity’ as 
their favoured foundational principle, including Alice Henkin, whom Moyn describes, 
somewhat surprisingly, as ‘influential’ in the new movement.60 
On this reading, the concept of ‘dignity’ met an (unarticulated) intuition that 
there was a need to identify a foundational utopian principle, and the human rights 
movement uses the concept of human rights instrumentally to achieve the realization 
of this more foundational principle. It is clear that if ‘human dignity’ is the foundation 
for the ‘new’ human rights, and if dignity was also the basis for earlier understandings 
of rights, that would provide a strong connection between the human rights 
movements of the 1970s, the post-War push for the Universal Declaration on Human 
Rights in which the concept of dignity played such a significant role, and the 
development of emancipatory campaigns in the 19th Century. Indeed, the linkage 
between human rights and human dignity arguably also provides a connection 
between human rights and the much older concept of ‘natural rights’. Moyn refers to 
Myres McDougal’s use of ‘dignity’ as an example of ‘old fashioned naturalism in 
disguise’.61  
This is only one reading of Moyn’s argument. This reading is not consistent 
with other parts of the book in which he appears to suggest that no foundational 
principle is identifiable, and that the substance of human rights was a contingent 
patchwork of diverse claims.62 Indeed, his emphasis in the main is on the varied 
                                                      
58 ibid 63. 
59 E.g. ibid 82, 118, 128, 163. 
60 ibid, 204. The title of a book edited by Alice Henkin in 1978 was Human Dignity: 
The Internationalization of Human Rights (New York, 1978), although ‘dignity’ does not 
feature in the text of the book itself, and my argument does not depend on ‘dignity’ being 
central to the US human rights developments of the 1970s. 
61 ibid 195. 
62 ibid 17: ‘the concerns now addressed through a unified package of “human rights” 
have their own histories, with different chronologies and geographies, incubated as they were 
in separate traditions and for different reasons.’ 
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nature of the political projects that rights discourse serves, a functional analysis of 
human rights. This reading is also inconsistent with Moyn’s principal thesis that the 
human rights movement of the 1970s was a new movement, one whose development 
was characterized by discontinuity, rather than continuity. There is an alternative 
reading, therefore, one that Moyn himself appears to have adopted subsequently: that 
he had no well worked out theoretical understanding of human dignity prior to writing 
the book, and that his reference to dignity is largely inadvertent and shows no serious 
commitment to viewing it as foundational.63 On this reading, it was only after the 
book was published that Moyn seriously turned to consider the role of human dignity 
and its place in the history of human rights. After the book was published, Moyn’s 
argument has been much more straightforwardly rejectionist of the use of dignity as a 
significant element in the historical narrative,64 and there are indications of Moyn’s 
subsequent position in the latter portions of the book itself.  
Accepting the second reading as the more accurate reading, even if makes his 
earlier resort to dignity somewhat confusing, how then does Moyn explain away the 
uses of human dignity in human rights discourse, since a strong role for dignity as a 
thread cannot coexist with Moyn’s discontinuity thesis? While Moyn accepts that 
‘human dignity’ was the basis for movements in the past that might look to the 
uninformed eye like proto-human rights movements, and featured in the drafting of 
the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, he argues that the dominant use of 
dignity in human rights discourse arose from the influence of Catholic personalism in 
Europe in the 1930s and 1940s. Thus, after the first two references to dignity in the 
Prologue of The Last Utopia, dignity is subsequently referred to almost entirely in the 
                                                      
63 In correspondence arising from his comments on an earlier draft of this article 
(email correspondence on file with author), Professor Moyn accepts ‘that there is a residue of 
reference to “dignity” in which I inadvertently register its importance … it would be wrong to 
saddle me with any serious commitments in regards to the relation between dignity and rights 
or the history of human dignity since my thinking about it was non-existent when I wrote the 
book.’  
64 Moyn has subsequently published several articles and comments on the history of 
‘human dignity’ which further illustrate his hardening of attitude towards the use of dignity, 
based on his view that dignity may have become ‘too controverted to be available … for 
useful invocation.’ See Samuel Moyn, The Secret History of Constitutional Dignity, in 
McCrudden, Understanding Human Dignity (n 55) 95 (reprinted in a longer form in Samuel 
Moyn, ‘The Secret History of Constitutional Dignity’ Yale Human Rights and Development 
Law Journal (forthcoming)), and Samuel Moyn, Dignity’s Due, The Nation, October 15, 
2013, available at: < http://www.thenation.com/article/176662/dignitys-due#>, last accessed 
April 25, 2014 (hereafter ‘Moyn, Dignity’s Due). 
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Catholic personalist65 or European contexts,66 enabling him to confine and cabin the 
concept. Catholic personalism was conservative and ‘spiritualist’67 and thus incapable 
of grounding the human rights movement of the 1970s that was progressive and 
secular.68 Emphasizing the European context also enables Moyn to develop clear blue 
water between the flowering of the global human rights movement in the 1970s and 
the earlier growth of the European human rights movement built on the European 
Convention on Human Rights, seeing the latter as a throwback to the Catholic 
personalist past, and therefore distinct from the new international movements of the 
1970s.  
His argument that there is a sharp distinction between the earlier uses of 
dignity and the later uses of dignity is, however, unconvincing,69 in at least two 
respects.  First, the Catholic personalist use of dignity and its use in ensuring Catholic 
support for human rights did, indeed, play a significant role in the development of the 
Universal Declaration and its subsequent understanding, and it was indeed a 
potentially conservative movement. But it also had the potential to become a 
progressive movement, and its progressive side did indeed emerge after the Second 
Vatican Council in the 1960s, and this, in turn, fed into the developing (secular) 
human rights movement that came to fruition in the 1970s. It is not coincidental that 
several of those that Moyn himself identifies as icons of the ‘new’ human rights 
movement in the 1970s were influenced by Catholic social thought, notably the 
founder of Amnesty International (Peter Benenson70), the founder of the International 
                                                      
65 Moyn (n 8) 50, 65, 67. 
66 ibid 209-10; 218. 
67 ibid 209-10. 
68 That this is indeed a reasonable reading of his book is confirmed by his subsequent 
discussion of the distinction between the ‘original’ meaning of dignity in the Preamble of the 
1937 Constitution of Ireland - Bunreacht na hÉireann, and its current use in human rights 
discourse, see Moyn (n 64), in McCrudden, Understanding Human Dignity (n 55). 
69 There is now a growing literature on this issue, to which I have contributed, see 
Christopher McCrudden, ‘Human dignity and judicial interpretation of human rights’ (2008) 
19 European  Journal of International Law 655. For an overview of the current debates, see 
Christopher McCrudden, ‘In Pursuit of Human Dignity: An Introduction to Current Debates’ 
in McCrudden, Understanding Human Dignity (n 55) 1. 
70 Fredrick M. Shepherd, Introduction, in Fredrick M. Shepherd (ed), Christianity and 
human rights: Christians and the struggle for global justice (Lexington Books, 2009), xiii, 
describing how ‘strong religious convictions were central to Peter Benenson’s decision to 
engage in human rights activism and, ultimately, to found Amnesty International.’ 
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Commission of Jurists and one of the leading lights of Amnesty (Séan MacBride71), as 
well as leading lights in the human rights movements in central Europe in the 1980s 
(Václav Havel72). 
Second, there is also historical evidence (I put it no higher than that) that the 
linkage between the use of dignity language and rights was not limited to the mid-
twentieth century European and Catholic personalist contexts to which Moyn seeks to 
confine it.73 Although the history of dignity has yet to be written, there is evidence 
that grass roots movements for reform in the 19th and 20th Centuries, in places as 
diverse as the United States, Russia, and South America, and arising in such different 
contexts as the labour, abolitionist, feminist, anti-racist, and anti-colonial movements, 
all used the concept of dignity, sometimes combining it with references to human 
rights. These movements spread well beyond the European theatre, and were not 
confined primarily to the 1930s and 1940s. In concentrating on elite texts and 
orthodox politics, Moyn underestimates the extent and depth of this connection. His 
bold claim that ‘when the French Revolution and the struggle for the freedoms of 
blacks, women and workers won across the nineteenth century, no one said it was 
because of human dignity’,74 is patently false. There are numerous examples of the 
language of dignity being used in support of the abolition of the slave trade in 
France75 and Latin America,76 the emancipation of the serfs in Russia,77 women’s 
                                                      
71 Anthony J. Jordan, Seán MacBride: A Biography (1993, Dublin: Blackwater Press). 
72 Allan White OP, ‘Magna est Veritas et praevalebit’ (1990) 71, Issue 837, New 
Blackfriars 194, 199, discussing at length ‘Havel’s personalist programme’. 
73 Rebecca J Scott, ‘Dignité/Dignidade: Organizing against Threats to Dignity in 
Societies after Slavery’ in McCrudden, Understanding Human Dignity (n 55) 61. 
74 Moyn, Dignity’s Due (n 64). 
75 Preamble to the 1848 Decree abolishing slavery in the French Empire, 27 April 
1848, Moniteur universel, 2 May 1848, 921 (‘Considering that slavery is an assault on human 
dignity …’). 
76 Simon Bolivar, Message to the Congress of Bolivia (Lima, 25 May 1826): slavery 
was denounced as a ‘shameless violation of human dignity’, quoted in Paolo Carozza, ‘From 
Conquest to Constitutions: Retrieving a Latin American Tradition of the Idea of Human 
Rights’ (2003) 25 Human Rights Quarterly 281, 300 
77 See, e.g., ‘Declaration of Alexander II Emancipating the Serfs (March 3, 1861)’, 
reprinted in translation in James Harvey Robinson and Charles Beard (eds), Readings in 
Modern European History (Boston, Ginn and Company, 1908), vol. 2: ‘Russia will not forget 
that the nobility, actuated solely by its respect for the dignity of man and its love for its 
neighbours, has spontaneously renounced the rights it enjoyed in virtue of the system of 
serfdom now abolished.’ 
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rights in Europe,78 workers’ rights in France79 and Russia,80 socialism,81 and in the 
context of the anti-colonial struggle in South America.82  
Indeed, there is some support for the idea that ‘dignity’ may have provided a 
conceptual ‘lynch pin’ between rights and their legal protection as human rights at 
this much earlier period than Moyn cares to acknowledge.83 Moyn writes that the 
‘emergence of specific rights by no means explains how they were reinterpreted as 
part of a fused list, and then made into ‘human rights’ later still.’84 But it is in the 
period between the early 1800s and the end of World War II that we see the 
development and spread of the concept of human dignity that Moyn sees as having 
comes to define the underlying purpose of human rights, when he identifies the aim of 
the ‘new’ human rights as being to achieve the protection of ‘the dignity of each 
individual’.85 That concept is, as we have seen, a leitmotiv of his book. But he fails to 
join the dots. In particular, when he writes, speaking of the ‘broken history’ of human 
rights (meaning the supposed retreat from rights in the 19th Century), that the ‘true 
key’ ‘is the move from the politics of the state to the morality of the globe’ he fails to 
recognize that this move can be identified in the nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries using ‘dignity’ as a common language in which to express normativity.86  
Ignoring the domestic history of rights during the nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries means missing out the development of a critical concept that itself 
                                                      
78 Sylvia Palatschek and Bianka Pietrow-Ennker (eds), Women’s Emancipation 
Movements in the Nineteenth Century (Stanford University Press, 2004) 88, 177, 260. 
79 John M Merriman, The Red City: Limoges and the French Nineteenth Century 
(OUP, 1985) 75. 
80 Mark D Steinberg, ‘Vanguard Workers and the Morality of Class’ in Lewis H 
Siegelbaum and Ronald Grigor Suny (eds), Making Workers Soviet: Power, Class and 
Identity (Cornell University Press, 1994), 66, 69, 72, 74, and 75. For examples of the 
importance of ‘dignity’ in 19th Century Russian literature and philosophy, see G.M. Hamburg 
and Randall A Poole (eds), A History of Russian Philosophy 1830-1930: Faith, Reason, and 
the Defence of Human Dignity (Cambridge University Press, 2010). 
81 Garibaldi expressed sympathy for incipient socialism in 1871, seeing it mainly as 
“a sentiment of justice and human dignity’, quoted in Alfonso Scirocco, Garibaldi: Citizen of 
the World: A Biography (Princeton University Press, 2007), xi. 
82 Jeremy Adelman, Sovereignty and Revolution in the Iberian Atlantic (Princeton 
University Press, 2006) 187, 208. 
83 Jeffrey Flynn, ‘Human Rights in History and Contemporary Practice: Source 
Materials for Philosophy’ in C. Corradetti (ed.), Philosophical Dimensions of Human Rights: 
Some Contemporary Views (Springer, 2012), 1, 17 discussing Jürgen Habermas, ‘The concept 
of human dignity and the realistic Utopia of human rights’ (2010) 41(4) Metaphilosophy 464. 
84 Moyn (n 8) 17. 
85 ibid 1. 
86 On ‘normativity’, see below, section 4. 
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embodies both continuity and discontinuity: continuity, in embodying a core 
understanding of the value of the human person; discontinuity, in the different ways in 
which that value is understood and protected. Indeed, to generalize the point, with 
some notable exceptions,87 human rights histories appear not to recognize sufficiently 
the connection between the concept of human dignity and the concept of human rights 
and therefore miss the critical importance of the nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries in the spread of this central pillar in the ideology of human rights activism 
that flowered in the later part of the twentieth century. More recent historical work is 
beginning to generate support for this hypothesis,88 but my purpose here is not to 
argue that any necessary foundational connection between human rights and dignity 
has been established, nor (again) to suggest that one or more foundational meta-
principles are a necessary part of the architecture of understanding human rights. 
Instead, I aim merely to highlight how Moyn underestimates the extent to which the 
‘new’ human rights in practice share significant value continuities with what went 
before, and thus to point to a potential path of inquiry that could be more thoroughly 
explored in further work.  
 
C. Moyn and Internationalism 
 
For Moyn, upholding human rights requires ensuring that ‘the dignity of each 
individual will enjoy secure international protection.’89 Moyn’s approach here, as we 
shall see subsequently is the case in other respects as well, is strongly reminiscent of 
John Rawls’ view that breaches of rights become human rights violations only in so 
far as they justify international intervention, leading to Rawls’ strong distinction 
between ‘constitutional rights’ and ‘human rights’, with only the latter having the 
                                                      
87 A prominent recent example is Hans Joas, Die Sakralität der Person. Eine neue 
Genealogie der Menschenrechte (Suhrkamp, Berlin 2012) translated as The Sacredness of the 
Person: A New Genealogy of Human Rights (Washington DC, Georgetown University Press, 
2013) (hereafter ‘Joas, Sacredness’). See also Jean H Quataert, Advocating Dignity: Human 
Rights Mobilizations in Global Politics (Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Press, 
2009). 
88 Joas (n 87), chapter 3 ‘Violence and Human Dignity: How Experiences Become 
Rights’. 
89 Moyn (n 8) 1, emphasis added. 
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requisite degree of international involvement.90 But Moyn’s (unintentional?) adoption 
of the distinction that Rawls sought to emphasize between ‘constitutional’ rights and 
‘human’ rights means that Moyn’s argument falls into some of the same problems that 
Rawls’ approach encounters. James Griffin is surely right that ‘the point of human 
rights’ go beyond Rawls’ idea of human rights as merely establishing ‘rules of war 
and conditions for justified intervention.’91  For Griffin, human rights ‘quite obviously 
have point intra-nationally,’ as I shall now explain. 
The ‘new’ human rights practice that Moyn argues came into existence in the 
1970s never operated under Moyn’s constraint that it be ‘international’ in the sense of 
aiming to transcend the nation state as guarantor of human rights. The distinction 
between ‘international human rights’ and ‘constitutional rights’ has become fuzzy and 
indistinct, particularly in those jurisdictions that enacted their constitutional rights 
protections after World War II (which is the bulk of states). Since 1945, ‘domestic 
constitutional orders [are] shaped in part by demands that state reconstruction be 
negotiated within a framework that recognizes and implements particular forms of the 
range of available transnational human rights’.92 At least in these states, it is clearly 
envisaged that the first port of call for effective implementation of international 
human rights norms is to be at the domestic level.  In several human rights treaties, 
there are provisions that require the ratifying state to implement the treaty effectively 
in the country’s domestic law.93 Also, whilst some human rights treaties provide for 
independent international supervisory mechanisms and procedures for ruling on 
complaints, as a general rule those complaining must have exhausted domestic 
remedies before being able to complain successfully. Increasingly, too, in several 
jurisdictions, domestic courts have regard to international legal norms that have not 
even passed the test of formal validity for that legal system.   
                                                      
90 John Rawls, The Law of Peoples (Harvard University Press, 1999) (hereafter 
‘Rawls’). Rawls is not alone. Joseph Raz and Charles Beitz also appear to focus on human 
rights as operating in the context where international intervention would be justified, see 
Joseph Raz, ‘Human Rights Without Foundations’ in Samantha Besson and John Tasioulas 
(eds), The Philosophy of International Law (OUP, 2010), chapter 15, 321; Charles Beitz, The 
Idea of Human Rights (OUP, 2009) (hereafter ‘Beitz’). 
91 James Griffin, On Human Rights (OUP, 2009), at 343. 
92 Heinz Klug, ‘Transnational Human Rights: Exploring the Persistence and 
Globalization of Human Rights’ (2005) 1 Annual Review of Law and Social Science 85, 93. 
93 E.g. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966), article 2. 
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Moyn generally underestimates the extent to which international human rights 
law currently depends, and is seen to depend, on building successful national 
processes.  International human rights have consistently been seen as complementing 
national developments rather than transcending them.  Practices that are central to the 
operation and interpretation of human rights at the international level, such as the 
requirement to exhaust domestic remedies, the wide discretion given by those 
interpreting and enforcing international human rights law to state decision-making, 
the ability of states through reservations to tailor the obligations being taken on to 
their local situation, all these indicate the important continuing role of the state, and 
also their role as the appropriate first line of defence of human rights.  
Nor is the resort to ‘international protection’, when it does occur, one 
primarily driven by an ideology that seeks to ‘transcend’ the nation state. Although 
international movements have undoubtedly played a critical role in popularizing and 
embedding human rights, Moyn tends to ignore the significant instances where major 
developments in international human rights were made by the adoption by local and 
international organizations of international human rights tools, not because of any 
commitment to utopian internationalism, but as a practical response to the failure of 
the domestic institutions to address their complaints. In practice, with the exception of 
a handful of individuals and groups, the use of international human rights law is a 
pragmatic response to the failure of domestic remedies, and not based on any 
principled desire to ‘transcend’ the nation state.  
Are these points compatible with Moyn’s claim that the ‘new’ human rights 
are essentially international rights, in the sense that they are rights that individuals 
have to international protection, even though that protection may be seen as a last 
resort, and even though states are accorded a primary role in protection, and even 
though resort to international standards is often pragmatic rather than ideological?  
Moyn might respond that his argument can accommodate the idea that the 
requisite international protection may be protection as a last resort, but this seems 
unconvincing: with the notable exception of the European regional arrangements 
(which, ironically, he marginalizes), the role of international action has become so 
minimal in actual practice in the vast majority of cases that it makes little sense to 
think of them as primarily rights to international protection in any strong sense of 
intervention that seeks to trump national sovereignty. Moyn might respond further, 
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however, that since (as I’ve suggested) his argument in general is similar to that of 
Charles Beitz and Joseph Raz, and since they include within the idea of ‘intervention’ 
an expansive idea that would include formal criticism, that is all he (Moyn) meant to 
include also.  As John Tasioulas has pointed out in his criticism of Raz, however, it is 
hard to understand how mere criticism gives rise to any challenge to national 
sovereignty,94 bringing us back to my criticism that the view that human rights 
‘transcend’ the state in general or in (most) particular cases seems a misguided 
understanding of current human rights practice. 
There is another possible response to my argument, which is that I have 
misunderstood what, precisely, Moyn means by ‘international’ protection. There is an 
important ambiguity as to what is meant by ‘international’ in much of the book, 
despite its centrality to his thesis. There are several possible meanings. In the first 
meaning, for protection to be ‘international’ may require that it be provided by other 
than a particular nation state; ‘international’ in that sense means more like ‘supra-
national,’ and in the previous paragraphs that is the sense that I have assumed that 
Moyn intends. In the second meaning, ‘international’ envisages some form of 
arrangement between nation states; it is ‘inter-national’. In the third sense, 
‘international’ means something more like ‘transnational’, in the sense that there is a 
movement across borders, but without any need for any ‘international’ element to be 
involved in the first or second senses of the term. Lastly, ‘international’ can mean 
something closer to ‘global’, in the sense that coverage stretches round the world. 
Moyn glides too easily between these different uses of the term, leaving a 
significant degree of uncertainty in his wake. In most cases, he refers to the human 
rights development he regards as ‘new’ as one arising at the ‘international’ level 
(undefined). On other occasions, however, he refers to the ‘utopia of supranational 
governance through law’,95 to the ‘supranational values encapsulated in the new 
human rights’,96 to ‘the evolution of supranational human rights mechanisms, for 
example at the United Nations and in the European region’.97 On yet other occasions, 
                                                      
94 John Tasioulas, ‘Towards a Philosophy of Human Rights’ (2012) 65 Current Legal 
Problems 1, 22-24 (hereafter ‘Tasioulas, Towards a Philosophy of Human Rights’). 
95 Moyn (n 8) 81. 
96 ibid 90. 
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he refers to ‘human rights as a powerful transnational ideal’,98 as ‘a set of global 
political norms providing the creed of a transnational social movement’,99 the 
‘crystallization of transnational human rights activities’ around the Helsinki 
process,100 and the ‘transnational human rights movement’.101 Perhaps the best 
example of the way in which these terms are used willy-nilly, interchangeably, but 
without clear definition, is where he refers to the ‘role [of] international rights norms’ 
in ‘how nation-states and supranational organizations sought public legitimacy’, then 
referring to the ‘global human rights revolution’.102 
This shifting between terms that are clearly related but potentially distinct may 
seem just like slippery-ness, but it a rather calculated slippery-ness. It enables Moyn 
to adopt different senses of ‘international’ when it suits his purposes. Historical 
evidence of a strong transnational movement of rights consciousness across borders 
in certain periods is available, such as in the mid-19th Century,103 the inter-War years, 
and after 1945, but these do not, apparently, amount to an ‘international’ development 
of the type that Moyn argues happens in the 1970s. But the ‘transnational’ 
relationship between NGOs that occurs in the 1970s does. The incorporation of 
universalistic norms (such as religiously-based principles) in European constitutions 
in the 1930s is not ‘international’ presumably because it depends on national 
enforcement, but sustained NGO activity to secure the enforcement of universal 
norms by the United Nations is part of the developments that are seen as developing 
‘international’ human rights in the 1980s, even though the UN bodies that were 
appealed to were often made up of representatives of the nation states.  
As in the previous section, my aim in this section is not to argue for a 
particular conceptual relationship between ‘human rights’ and ‘international 
protection’, but rather to point to the difficulties that Moyn faces in justifying his 
argument that the ‘new’ human rights has a different relationship with the notion of 
‘international protection’ to that adopted in earlier understandings of human rights.  
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D. Moyn and Universalism 
 
I have suggested in the previous section that the ‘new’ international human rights 
movement is less ‘international’ in its orientation than Moyn supposes. In this section, 
I suggest that the ‘old’ systems of rights protections were also less ‘local’ and 
particularistic than he asserts. These older developments didn’t presage the human 
rights developments of the 1970s, Moyn says, because ‘no one has so far discovered 
any additional, popular language of international human rights on the ground in these 
years anywhere in the world.’104  
This is highly questionable.  We have already seen that ‘dignity’ may have 
played an important role in supplying a language of universality but, leaving that 
aside, there is also evidence in the United States105 and Haiti106 of significant 
universalistic human rights language not explicitly using ‘dignity’, but embracing 
something close. Perhaps the best example is also the most obvious. In speaking of 
slavery and related issues, it was not uncommon to speak of human rights.107 Indeed, 
in 1806 Thomas Jefferson, in his message to Congress, referred explicitly to ‘the 
violation of human rights, which has been so long continued on the unoffending 
inhabitants of Africa, and which the morality, the reputation and the best interests of 
the country have long been eager to proscribe.’108 If this is hardly vernacular use, then 
consider how, in 1836, Reuben Crandell was indicted for publishing libels tending to 
                                                      
104 Moyn (n 8) 66. 
105 Richard A Primus, The American Language of Rights (Cambridge University 
Press, 1999) 88-89 examines in detail American debates at the beginning of the 19th Century 
on the place of natural rights and natural law as sources of the U.S. Constitution, considering 
how far they were based on universalistic understandings. For an important example of this 
debate in the U.S. courts, see Calder v Bull, 3 U.S. 386 (1798). 
106 See, especially Robin Blackburn, The American Crucible: Slavery, Emancipation 
and Human Rights (Verso, 2013), chapter 14.  See also Ada Ferrer, ‘Haiti, Free Soil, and 
Antislavery in the Revolutionary Atlantic’ (2012) 117(1) American Historical Review 40, 52, 
where local Haitian courts are described as having been given the role of applying ‘the rights 
of man’. Ferrer comments: ‘national law would have a duty to universalize rights.’  
107 Moyn, Substance, Scale, and Salience (n 1) 131 repeats the argument that ‘rights 
claims figured only very marginally in’ anti-slave activism, although this claim now seems to 
refer to international legal rights claims. The ambiguity of what ‘international’ means in this 
context is explored below. 
108 Sixth Annual Message of President Jefferson to the Ninth Congress, December 2 
1806, available at: <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=29448> (last 
accessed April 25, 2014). This is not to suggest that the term ‘human rights’ as Jefferson uses 
it is simply synonymous with current understandings of the term, on which see Hunt, 
Inventing Human Rights (n 4) 22. 
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excite sedition among slaves and ‘free coloured persons’.109  This consisted of a plan 
to ‘promulgate the doctrine of human rights in high places and low places, … till it 
forms one of the foundation principles and parts indestructible, of the public soul.’ He 
ends his plea: ‘I desire peace; the peace of universal love; of catholic sympathy; the 
peace of common interest; a common feeling, a common humanity. But so long as 
slavery is tolerated, no such peace can exist.’ 
In the courts, too, the relationship between universalistic ‘rights’ language and 
slavery was particularly evident, and it is surprising that Moyn pays so little attention 
to this rich resource. Three examples must suffice. The Amistad case (one of the most 
important cases in the 19th Century United States Supreme Court) concerned a 
freedom suit by a group of Africans.110 The group comprised kidnapped Africans who 
had taken over a slave ship that was transporting them across the Atlantic. The vessel 
was discovered in American waters and the Africans brought to shore. Various parties 
sought to have the federal courts restore the Africans to them as their property.  The 
Africans denied that they were slaves or property, and that the court should refuse the 
claims.  One of the lawyers, Roger Sherman Baldwin, argued that ‘delivering them up 
to their oppressors’ would make the United States ‘accessories to … atrocious 
violations of human rights’. John Quincy Adams, also acting for the Africans, drew 
likewise on a human rights argument, mentioning the term ‘human rights’ three times, 
twice as central elements in critical sections of the speech.111 
The second example concerns the Quock Walker case (Commonwealth v. 
Jennison), one of the earliest Massachusetts cases concerning the status of slavery 
under state law. In his instructions to the jury, Chief Justice William Cushing held that 
the constitution granted rights that were incompatible with slavery. His instructions 
were formulated in clearly universalistic terms, contrasting the approach before and 
after American independence:  
‘…whatever sentiments have formerly prevailed in this particular or slid in upon us 
by the example of others, a different idea has taken place with the people of America, 
                                                      
109 U.S. v. Crandell, 4 Cranch C.C. 683, 25 F.Cas. 684 (1836). 
110 United States v Libellants and Claimants of the Schooner Amistad, 40 U.S. 518 
(1841). 
111 Argument of John Quincy Adams, Before the Supreme Court of the United States 
in the Case of the United States, Appellants, vs. Cinque, and Others, Africans, Captured in the 
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< http://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/amistad_002.asp> (last accessed, February 18, 
2014). 
  
 
 
25 
more favorable to the natural rights of mankind, and to that natural, innate desire of 
Liberty, with which Heaven (without regard to color, complexion, or shape of noses--
features) has inspired all the human race. (…)  I think the idea of slavery is 
inconsistent with our own conduct and Constitution; and there can be no such thing as 
perpetual servitude of a rational creature … .’112 
In the 1824 English case of Forbes v Cochrane and Cockburn,113 several 
slaves had escaped from ‘a foreign country,’ where slavery was legally permitted, and 
succeeded in getting on board a British warship on the high seas.  To protect them 
from being reclaimed by a British subject, resident in that country, the court held that 
these men, who clearly were not citizens, ‘when on board an English ship, had all 
the rights belonging to Englishmen …’.  
Finally, Bradley Miller has provided a persuasive reading of the famous 1860 
Anderson case in Canada,114 in which the Canadian courts had to decide whether to 
send back a fugitive slave to the United States, and in which the claim was explicitly 
framed in universalistic language.115 Not least, Miller makes clear that the arguments 
were framed in this way not primarily to persuade the judges in the case, but to 
establish a clear basis for subsequent political activism should the judges decide to 
extradite him. The dissent by Justice McLean (subsequently Chief Justice of Upper 
Canada) even uses the term ‘human rights’ to denote the issues at stake.   
There is a danger that attempting to address Moyn’s argument merely 
descends into simply looking for counterexamples that either involve a specific phrase 
or trans-state morality, and there is much fruitful work to be done in attempting to 
determine which is the rule and which is the exception. But at least we can say that it 
is difficult to understand from these examples how Moyn can be quite so dismissive 
of the emancipation movement as a precursor of the ‘new’ human rights movement 
                                                      
112 Albert P Blaustein and Robert L. Zangrando (eds), Civil Rights and the Black 
American: A Documentary History, (Washington Square Press, a Division of Simon & 
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post 1970.116 It challenges Moyn’s view that 19th Century humanitarianism (the 
‘politics of suffering abroad’) diverged from extending human rights (‘the politics of 
citizenship at home’), and that it was only much later, in the 1970s, that the two 
approaches came together.  The emancipation movement demonstrates how these 
traditions came together, at least to some extent, during the 19th Century. Nor was this 
type of universalistic language restricted to slavery.117  
What emerges from the history of the development of rights in the nineteenth 
and the twentieth centuries is, indeed, both a radical discontinuity between different 
understandings of rights, and evidence of the political contingency of the extent and 
type of protection accorded. But we also see, in Alston’s phrase, ‘indispensible 
elements of continuity’,118 important flashes of the transnationalization of rights-talk, 
the use of rights in political and legal argument to generate solidarity across borders, 
and the adoption of rights that are not tied to citizenship. This challenges Hoffmann’s 
(and Moyn’s) exclusion of ‘historical struggles for concrete rights and privileges – 
which were not intended to be universal, but rather tied to specific groups.’119 
Including these would not, as Hoffmann argues, ‘amount to rewriting the entire legal 
history as a history of human rights’, but it would enrich the writing of history of 
human rights.  
 
E. Moyn and Human Rights Borrowing 
 
I now move to examine the fourth reason for being sceptical about Moyn’s radical 
discontinuity thesis: that the ‘new’ and the ‘old’ rights both share an important 
methodology. A strong tradition of comparative human rights developed in the 
nineteenth and in the first half of the twentieth centuries that significantly shaped the 
conception of human rights that we see today. Moyn acknowledges ‘that the catalogue 
of items in the [Universal Declaration] drew from domestic constitutions around the 
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world, and notably in Latin America … Rights talk in the sense of domestic 
constitutionalism and the citizenship struggles it allows were familiar in many parts of 
the world, Latin America not least …’120 A little later he writes that: ‘The domestic 
agenda of the Latin American states in these debates, especially Cuba, was to bring 
the new declaration into conformity with the American Declaration of the Rights and 
Duties of Man, passed in Bogotá, Columbia in spring 1948 …’121 As regards the 
European Convention on Human Rights, ‘the content of rights catalogues seemed 
domestically uncontroversial, secured either time out of mind or in recent memory.’122 
When Moyn describes the content of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and 
the inclusion of social rights, he notes that ‘[t]here was little conceptually new about 
them, especially given their prominence in interwar European constitutions (first in 
the Weimar Constitution of 1919, and most expansively in the new Soviet 
Constitution of 1936 …’123 He quotes the Yugoslav delegate speaking just before the 
vote on the Universal Declaration in the General Assembly who said that the 
Universal Declaration ‘simply ‘codified’ long since secured political and civil 
rights’.124 
The development of international human rights law in the 1940s by some of its 
major practitioners often seemed to presuppose, however, a fundamental 
methodological break from the way that rights protection had been developed prior to 
that time, in attempting to move away from the use of a comparative methodology. 
When Sir Hersch Lauterpacht drafted his international charter of rights in 1945, he 
excised much of the comparative constitutional material in the accompanying 
commentary. He appears to have considered that the development of international 
human rights should get beyond the traditional comparative method. As the late 
A.W.B. Simpson explained:  
‘In [Lauterpacht’s] discussion there is only the scantiest reference to the various other 
draft Bills of Rights then in existence. He mentions H. G. Wells's chaotic draft, the 
French Declarations of 1789 and 1793, the American National Resources Planning 
Board draft and a number of provisions in national constitutions. (…) His bill is in no 
sense a paste and scissors job. Nor does it represent an attempt to deduce from State 
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constitutions, and other sources, a consensus as to the basic individual rights 
requiring protection.’125  
Lauterpacht is an important example of how some attempted to create a ‘new’ human 
rights after World War II, one that broke away from the previous emphasis on 
consensus and explicit comparison.  
For someone like Lauterpacht, the purpose of developing an international law 
of human rights was to enable a universal standard to replace the methods based on 
comparison used previously. There should be no need to resort to these because the 
international standard would substitute for them. We can legitimately speak of the 
‘rise and fall’ of comparative human rights, meaning that from the period roughly 
beginning in the late eighteenth century until the 1930s, one significant way in which 
human rights thinking was spread was though the comparative method, and the way in 
which international human rights was defined was largely by consensus. From the 
1940s, attempts were made, partly successfully, to replace this comparative and 
consensus method with a process of internationalization based on foundational 
principles. For a brief period, then, the international standard appeared to substitute 
for a comparative standard.126 Determined though this attempt was, the comparative 
method has remained stubbornly pervasive. Gradually, the ‘pure’ international 
influence moderated significantly and the use of comparison alongside the 
international norms, where they are used at all, emerges. The development of the 
comparative method was and is still one of the foundations of human rights, although 
that comparison takes place in different forums in somewhat different ways.  
One example must suffice. Human rights activists in the United States, and 
many American academic international lawyers, have increasingly taken the position 
that adherence to international treaties is not necessary in order for the state to be 
legally bound in international law, seeking in particular to base human rights norms 
on customary international law rather than treaty. Customary international law is 
based on opinion juris but also on a fluid concept of consensus, based partly on state 
practice (involving a strong element of comparative analysis). Moyn’s singling out of 
this development as an important move in the American academic acceptance of 
‘international human rights’ in its 1970s form is part of his story of how the 
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underpinnings of his conception of this ‘new’ human rights transcended the nation 
state.  
That is one possible reading, but there is another: that legal scholars in the 
1970s were (intentionally or unintentionally) reflecting an older approach to the 
identification of rights, not only providing a clear link between the ‘new’ human 
rights and regional approaches, such as under the European Convention on Human 
Rights, but earlier still. Moyn accepts the basic point that comparative human rights 
developed in the nineteenth and in the first half of the twentieth centuries in a way 
that significantly shaped current conceptions of human rights. And, as we have seen, 
Moyn does, in fact, clearly understand that comparison and consensus-based 
approaches played, and continued to play, an important role in the development of 
human rights thinking in the United States in the ‘new’ human rights, from the 1970s 
onward, but he underestimates the significance of this practice: that there is 
significantly greater continuity over the past two hundred years than Moyn appears 
willing to accept in the way in which human rights are identified and interpreted in 
practice, identifying consensus from the practice of comparison, by lawyers, human 
rights activists, international negotiators and judges (what we might call their ‘human 
rights methodology’).  
This provides an important element of continuity between Moyn’s ‘new’ 
human rights and previous approaches, a continuity that further undermines Moyn’s 
principal thesis. Appreciating the importance of agreement-based theories challenges 
Moyn’s downplaying of the relevance of the period between the early nineteenth 
century and the 1940s. In particular, a key method by which the content and 
interpretation of human rights takes place now is through the use of comparative 
human rights methodologies, and that this is as true now, as it was the nineteenth 
centuries. What has changed, and it is a significant change, is who does the 
comparison, and what the purpose of the comparison is. But beneath these 
differences, comparison remains a key indication of continuity from the early 
nineteenth century to the present. In both cases, there is a degree of bounded 
universalism, although the degree of boundedness will differ from time to time, and 
place to place. 
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Understanding the development of rights comparatively during the nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries emphasizes the need to integrate the histories of 
international and domestic protection of rights.127 A continuing feature of 
contemporary international human rights law and practice is that it not only 
significantly relies on domestic implementation to be at all effective (as we saw in the 
previous section), but that it is also constantly refreshed by developments at the 
domestic level, and vice versa. Indeed, the relationship between the domestic and the 
international is often symbiotic, not distinct, and certainly not top-down. This 
complex inter-relationship has its roots in the neglected period.  
 A fuller recognition of the importance of comparative rights developments 
would, for example, have enabled Moyn to address the question of why international 
human rights adopted the particular legal dimension that it does. One of the critical 
problems in current human rights histories is their failure to fully account for the 
move from political to legal conceptions of human rights.128 As Francesca Klug has 
pointed out, Moyn ‘does not provide an adequate account of why international human 
rights took the legal form they did following World War II.’129 This is not the place 
for a fully developed argument, but, for example, the idea that human rights might be 
enforced through courts, including by international courts, appears to have grown, in 
part, out of the critical early twentieth century invention of constitutional courts. It 
was the spread of the idea of constitutional courts through the emerging discipline of 
comparative law that may have helped pave the way for courts being seen as an 
appropriate, indeed as a critical, mechanism for enforcement post-1945. Some of 
these courts engaged in the interpretation and enforcement of constitutional rights. 
Had the idea that constitutional rights could be enforced in courts not caught on, it is 
unlikely that equivalent institutions, in which subjective rights could be asserted, 
would have been thought conceivable at the regional or international levels.  
 
4. Moyn’s Failure to Account for the Normative Power of Human Rights 
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The question of why human rights became important (in the sense of spreading so far 
and so fast) lies in part in the normativity of human rights, in their claim to speak truth 
to power. But what is the truth that they claim to embody?  A significant failing of 
The Last Utopia is Moyn’s inability to provide a historically convincing account of 
the normative power of the human rights idea. We have seen how, in his initial 
identification of the concept of ‘dignity’ as foundational, and his subsequent dismissal 
of the idea, Moyn seems to be both attracted and repelled by the normativity at the 
heart of human rights, seen from the perspective of those who adopt human rights 
discourse. In the first reading that I attributed to him, Moyn appeared to see the need 
to identify its normative heart and used the language of ‘dignity’ to do that but, if the 
second reading is correct, he subsequently sought to undermine its persuasiveness 
without replacing it with some other concept, and this has left a vacuum. 
In this Part, it is argued that human rights history-writing of the kind exemplified 
in Moyn’s book problematically separates questions to do with the origin 
and diffusion of human rights from questions to do with their nature and validity. This 
is where Moyn’s lack of engagement with the more theoretically inclined literature on 
human rights is most telling. Efforts to locate the origins and explain the trajectory of 
human rights need the orientation that comes from engagement with debates 
about what human rights are and why they are valid, because the philosophical 
analysis both identifies that there is an important normative element and, at the same 
time helps us to structure the different types of normative appeal. Historical and 
philosophical inquiry are inseparable in this regard.  
 
A. Genesis and Validity 
 
There are two strands of recent human rights scholarship that need to be distinguished 
at this point, strands which tend to operate in separate intellectual silos. On the one 
hand, an historical strand seeks to account for the genesis and spread of human rights, 
in which the central debate is how far current human rights practice demonstrates 
continuity or radical discontinuity with previous attempts to secure rights. Moyn’s 
discontinuity thesis in The Last Utopia, and the controversy surrounding it, can be 
seen as exemplifying this debate.  
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On the other hand, a philosophical strand seeks to consider claims regarding 
the nature and validity of human rights, in which a central question is whether and to 
what extent the normative power that human rights are claimed to possess is justified. 
Just as in the historiography of human rights, so too in the philosophy of human rights 
there are ‘orthodox’ theories, and theories that challenge this orthodoxy. The 
‘orthodox’ philosophical account (it is equally uncertain whether any philosophers 
actually believe this) is that human rights derive their normative power because they 
are based on an understanding of the human person as one possessed of value, simply 
in virtue of their humanity, and that the value placed on the human justifies the 
extensive protection of rights. This philosophical approach is sometimes called 
‘naturalistic’, in part because it harkens back to the idea of ‘natural’ rights. This 
approach then becomes not only a basis on which ‘human rights’ may be seen to be 
justified, it also becomes an independent basis on which human rights practice can be 
normatively assessed (and may be found to be wanting, not only in not going far 
enough, but also in going too far).  
Moyn adamantly appears to reject this ‘naturalistic’ understanding, but he 
does so without setting out his own theoretical account of what ‘human rights’ 
involve. Charles Beitz has usefully distinguished between three conceptions of human 
rights that have been proposed to address the puzzling question of their normative 
basis: first, the ‘naturalistic’ account, which we have encountered already; Beitz terms 
the second the ‘practical’ (or ‘political’) account, which was also discussed 
previously; the third is what he terms ‘agreement’-based accounts.130 On the basis of 
our earlier reconstructive sketch of Moyn’s theory of human rights, we can say that it 
is the second, based on an initial sketch by John Rawls in The Law of Peoples,131 
which is particularly apposite. For Rawls, ‘human rights’ should be distinguished 
from other types of rights. ‘[S]ome think of human rights,’ he wrote, ‘as roughly the 
same rights that citizens have in a reasonable constitutional democratic regime; this 
view simply expands the class of human rights to include all the rights that liberal 
                                                      
130 Beitz (n 90). Adam Etinson has noted that Beitz’s taxonomy ‘falls well short of a 
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governments guarantee.’132 By contrast, for Rawls, human rights ‘express a special 
class of urgent rights, such as freedom from slavery and serfdom, liberty (but not 
equal liberty) of conscience, and security of ethnic groups from mass murder and 
genocide.’ For Rawls, human rights, are ‘distinct from constitutional rights, or from 
the rights of liberal democratic citizenship, or from other rights that belong to certain 
kinds of political institutions, both individualist and associationist.’133  
For Rawls, one of the roles of human rights, in this sense, is that, when a state 
accords these human rights, this is ‘sufficient to exclude justified and forceful 
intervention by other people, for example, by diplomatic and economic sanctions, or 
in grave cases by military force.’134 Joseph Raz has a similar idea in mind. Raz argues 
that international human rights are best seen as setting the (very limited) conditions 
under which international intervention in another state (otherwise unjustified) would 
be justified to prevent action by a state against those on the territory of that state, 
including its own citizens.135   
I have focused on the ‘political conception’ because it is this that most appears 
to capture the theoretical understanding of human rights that Moyn has brought to his 
genealogical reconstruction, not least in emphasizing minimalism and 
internationalism. This is not to say that Moyn is operating on the same theoretical 
terrain as Rawls or Raz. The latter have normative reasons, for example, for being 
human rights minimalists, whilst Moyn has sociological reasons; that is, he maintains 
that by taking this form in the 1970s human rights were able to displace other more 
maximal but discredited utopian visions.136 Nevertheless, this difference aside, the 
resemblance between Moyn’s approach and that of those adopting a ‘political 
conception’ of human rights is striking.  
A central concern that ‘political’ conceptions of human rights share is an 
attempt to develop a normative conception of human rights that is in tune with 
‘human rights practice’. Raz, who is frequently cited as a significant exponent of a 
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sovereignty as criticism in practice is not regarded as an attack on sovereignty, Tasioulas, 
Towards a Philosophy of Human Rights (n 94) 22-23. 
136 I am particularly grateful to Jeff Flynn for pointing out these distinctions. 
  
 
 
34 
political conception building on Rawls, has identified the task of a ‘political’ theory of 
human rights consisting of two elements:137 ‘(a) to establish the essential features 
which contemporary human rights practice attributes to the rights it acknowledges to 
be human rights; and (b) to identify the moral standards which qualify anything to be 
so acknowledged.’138 Beitz has also suggested something similar.139 The second of 
Raz’s elements is where the issue of validity is considered, and (broadly speaking) we 
have seen that from their perspective the normative power of human rights is morally 
justified because they comprise a set of norms that allow international ‘intervention’ 
only in limited contexts where such intervention is necessary. 
 
B. Relationship Between History and Philosophy of Human Rights  
 
A relatively unexplored issue is what the implications are of the historical debates on 
genesis for the philosophical debates on validity, and vice versa. Does it matter 
whether an historian of human rights, interested in genesis, has a theoretical 
understanding of the validity of human rights, and vice versa? Orthodox human rights 
theories in history and philosophy tend to share a strong ‘naturalistic’ understanding 
of human rights. ‘Orthodox’ history sees the idea of the inherent value of the human 
person as having strong explanatory power in why human rights were recognized and 
spread over time. Beyond such ‘orthodox’ histories, however, a significant portion of 
the scholarly literature on human rights in the disciplines of history and philosophy do 
not appear to touch one another. Some philosophers produce rational justifications 
examining claims regarding the validity of human rights, involving, as Hans Joas 
argues,140 attempts to develop ‘a moral philosophical argument that entails an 
unconditional, universal validity claim entirely independent of history.’141 Some 
historians produce narrative histories of the genesis and spread of human rights, 
untouched by any reflection on the philosophy of human rights.  In adopting these 
approaches, Joas argues, ‘the disciplines of history and philosophy reinforce the 
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distinction between genesis and validity.’142 We can call this the ‘separation’ 
approach. 
For others, this attempted separation of the history and philosophy of human 
rights is impossible. The general problem, as Joas puts it, ‘of how to mediate between 
history and normativity’,143 is one that is particularly acute in the relationship between 
the history of human rights and the philosophy of human rights because in dealing 
with ‘human rights’ we are dealing with a phenomenon that is quintessentially 
normative. The alternative approach to separation is to accept that the history of 
human rights cannot be segregated from its philosophy, and that the philosophy of 
human rights cannot be segregated from its history. A ‘linkage’ approach to the study 
of human rights in both philosophy and history seeks to ensure that the fruits of the 
historical study of the genesis of human rights are considered relevant to 
philosophical consideration of the validity of human rights, and vice versa.  
For Mahlmann, historians engaging in an historical examination of the 
genealogy of human dignity and (by extension, human rights) will, indeed must, come 
to the project with a pre-existing hypothesis as to what human rights are, Even those 
who come to the historical project innocent of any philosophical understanding of the 
debates on validity, because they confront the problem of how to mediate between 
history and normativity will have to develop, Mahlmann predicts, ‘a theoretical 
understanding of what one is actually looking for’, however sketchy and preliminary 
that hypothesis may turn out to be, as a ‘crucial precondition of any historical 
reconstruction’.144  
 A radically different approach is possible. For Joas, the question of source and 
diffusion can, indeed must, be intimately bound up with validity, and vice versa, but 
an historical approach to human rights in which philosophical understanding of the 
concept comes before historical inquiry, is highly problematic. Philosophy will 
generate an understanding of ‘human rights’ that then determines what should be 
looked for historically. As Joas puts it, ‘if we obtain an ideal through a nonhistorical 
moral philosophy, our relationship to history can only consist in evaluating all 
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historical phenomena according to the degree to which they approach the ideal …’145 
Joas’ alternative approach is one in which the relationship is not linear in this sense. 
His aim is to ‘construct the history of the genesis and dissemination of values in such 
a way that narrative and justification are interwoven within the history.’146 For Joas, 
genesis and validity ‘become intertwined in a way that cannot be conveyed by a 
simple distinction between is and ought, facts and values’.147 He continues: ‘In cases 
where the is in question itself contains an ought, as with historically originating norms 
and values [such as human rights], we position ourselves not only with respect to 
facticity, but also the validity claims of historical constructs.’  
 
C. Moyn’s Central Problem 
 
Despite their differences, what these accounts have in common is the view, which I 
share, that in order to understand why human rights became such a powerfully 
attractive basis for mobilization, we need, at least in part, to understand its 
normativity. We will not only fail to account for its powerful appeal, we will also fail 
to recognize an important thread of continuity. Moyn appears particularly concerned 
to undermine claims that the human rights movement that emerged after 1970 is 
underpinned by similar normative values that led, for example, churches or religious 
individuals to support human rights in previous generations, and that a theological 
explanation may underpin current normative claims. Moyn’s assumption that 
religiously influenced beliefs cannot be the basis for progressive movements seems 
more ideological than historical. More importantly, Moyn’s concern to distance the 
new human rights from the old leads him to throw the normative baby out with the 
theological bathwater, for it leads him to underestimate and be unable to account for 
the historical attractiveness of the normativity which human rights claims to promote.  
It is precisely this question of what may have underpinned its diffusion that those 
who consider issues of human rights validity can help us understand. We must be 
careful here. I am not arguing that we must develop a philosophically convincing 
understanding of validity in order to appreciate the origins and diffusion of human 
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rights, or that the historian must share the normative commitments identified as 
important, only that in understanding the debate over validity we can gain a fuller 
understanding of the normative power that contributed to its origins and diffusion. We 
do not have to share the normative ideas that drive human rights mobilization; we 
may even want to reject these normative ideas philosophically; but we do have to be 
able to articulate which normative ideals drive these actors, if we seek to give a 
convincingly rounded account of the power of human rights in history. In calling it 
‘utopian’ Moyn identifies the need to explain more precisely in what that utopianism 
lies, but he signally fails to rise to the challenge he has set himself.   
Joas, to his credit, tackles this difficult question head on. We may feel 
uncomfortable with the language in which Joas does this; we may reject the 
attractiveness of the norms he identifies as at the core of human rights normativity; we 
may even share Hannah Arendt’s skepticism as to whether human rights is capable of 
meeting the challenge of safeguarding the sacredness of the human person;148 but we 
cannot fail to be impressed by attempts to identify the power of human rights to move 
countless individuals to act in their name. More importantly, for the purposes of this 
article, Joas’ work highlights the absence in The Last Utopia of anything remotely 
powerful enough to serve as a convincing explanation of why human rights have 
proven to be so attractive. 
 
5. A Conclusion, and Moyn’s Defence 
 
Moyn has argued that his approach has a major advantage: emphasizing the radical 
discontinuity between previous rights’ developments and what happened in the 1970s 
disrupts the overly teleological approach to the development of human rights that he 
sees as characteristic of earlier ‘orthodox’ scholarship on the history of human rights. 
This orthodox narrative is one in which current human rights standards are seen as the 
culmination of an inexorable trend of historical development from the late eighteenth 
century to the present day – what Hoffmann characterizes as ‘the rise and rise of 
                                                      
148 Moyn (n 8) 42 quotes Arendt as worrying that the concept of human rights 
developed in the 1940s ‘presupposed nothing comparable, and would therefore provide 
nothing comparable – that as in prior history, there would continue to be ‘nothing sacred’ in 
the ‘abstract nakedness of being human’. 
  
 
 
38 
moral sensibilities’,149 and what Moyn characterizes as ‘naturalistic’, meaning that it 
is based on an idea of the innate worth of the human person. Instead, current human 
rights are ‘the unpredictable results of political contestations’.150  
I have suggested that Moyn’s ‘revisionist’151 historical analysis falls short of 
providing a convincing alternative narrative in several ways.  I have sought to 
challenge Moyn’s central thesis of radical discontinuity by stressing the extent to 
which Moyn underestimates several important continuities. Before concluding, 
however, it is only fair to consider Moyn’s recent responses, in which he addresses 
some similar points put by other critics.152 Moyn has recently conceded that he may 
underestimate several important continuities.153  In his defence, however, he has 
argued that even accepting that such continuities exist, ‘the fact remains that the 
discontinuities are both more massive and more interesting.’154 
A much more moderate, and careful version of his underlying thesis (shared, I 
suspect by human rights practitioners) is that something important did occur to human 
rights in the 1970s. The period since the 1970s had important distinguishing 
characteristics, both in the increased scale of activity labelled as ‘human rights’ (to 
which human rights NGOs significantly contributed), and in the increased salience 
accorded to human rights arguments in international relations (not least because 
ideological disagreements between the superpowers were partly framed in human 
rights terms), although in accepting this argument we need to be careful not to view 
scale and salience only from an American, or a Soviet, or a European perspective. We 
can also point to the rise, because of this increased scope and salience, of a 
professional field of human rights practice. 
  That would be a credible defence of an argument that could have been made 
in the book, but it is not a defence of the book, as written. To see current human rights 
discourse as qualitatively different at a fundamental level, as the book implies, is 
wrong-headed.155 I have argued that Moyn underestimates the role of dignity in 
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human rights practice (past and present); that he underestimates the universal 
character of ‘constitutional’ and revolutionary, rights;156 that he underestimates the 
primary importance of domestic actors and mechanisms in the current practice of 
international human rights; and that he underestimates the continuity of human rights 
borrowing as a prime methodology of how human rights is diffused. If these 
criticisms are correct, then his failure to address these appropriately does more than 
simply omit the ‘obvious’,157 it skews the narrative in a fundamentally misleading 
way. 
In seeking to avoid the problem of teleology, Moyn appears to have fallen into 
the opposite error, where, as Joas puts it, ‘history may fragment into disconnected 
parts’ and where ‘no connecting thread runs between them.’158 We have seen that the 
‘orthodox’ historical account attempts to explain the spread of human rights as based 
on reason and the power of rational ideas. That may well be overly simplistic, but if 
that does not explain the diffusion of human rights, what does? Any history of human 
rights requires some explanation as to how ideas are transferred between activists and 
intellectuals, between one set of states and another, and between diverse social 
movements.159 How is an historian of human rights to account for diffusion? Why did 
human rights come to be taken up and spread throughout the globe?  
Moyn’s approach appears to have little room for either agreement-based or 
naturalistic conceptions of human rights, seeing them as residues of a previous 
understanding of rights displaced by the development in the 1970s of the ‘new’ 
human rights. We have seen that this leads him to underestimate a characteristic 
methodology of human rights present in many different historical periods, but it also 
leads him to underestimate the continuing role of both naturalistic and agreement-
based theories in providing the type of connecting thread that Joas seeks. Reading 
Moyn’s book, there is an strong impression that any argument that hints at continuity, 
particularly one which incorporates a ‘naturalistic’ element, necessarily descends into 
teleology; the default position of historians should therefore be to refuse to identify 
any continuity and to resist, at all costs, any ‘naturalistic’ explanation. In Moyn’s 
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book, discontinuity risks becoming an ideological starting point rather than an 
empirical conclusion. He may have retreated from this position subsequently, but to 
imply that the continuities are so obvious as not to bear repeating, and that they 
should be already be ‘obvious’ to readers is surprising. 
The problem that particularly arises, when we contrast the radically different 
narratives that are possible, is whether it is the same thing that is being historicized.160 
We can see that there are different ways of thinking about human rights: as something 
institutional (in which case the issue for historians is when the term was used by 
particular institutions, such as judicially, legislatively, constitutionally), or as a 
concept that captures a set of understandings (in which case other words might be 
used to capture that set of understandings, such as ‘constitutional rights’, or ‘civil 
liberties’, or ‘civil rights’), or we might be interested simply in the vernacular use of 
the term (in which case the word might be used for several different purposes and is 
unlikely to be deeply theorized). A rich history of human rights would combine these 
differing elements, and we need to be aware that the current histories of human rights, 
like Moyn’s, are often only fragments of that richer history. 
Moyn’s subsequent explanation, that ‘if The Last Utopia is a conceptual 
history, it is not one concerned with the very idea of human rights’,161 is revealing 
because, as Joas and Mahlmann have argued, an understanding of how ‘the very idea 
of human rights’ was and is perceived is critical to undertaking the conceptual history 
of a normative concept. Seeing Moyn’s history partly through the lens of the recent 
debates about the normative underpinnings of human rights suggests that historians 
might find it useful to have some greater engagement with the philosophical literature 
on human rights that I discussed earlier. The range of different normative theories 
currently on display should lead historians to recognize the contested understanding 
of what the ‘human rights’ enterprise consists in,162 how far that debate itself has 
important antecedents in the history of political thought, and the importance of 
reflecting that debate in the attempt to set out the histories of human rights. In other 
words, what the philosophical debates reflect rather well are debates within human 
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rights practice, both current and historical. This should lead us to question what, 
exactly, is the understanding of human rights that Moyn considers to be ‘hegemonic’.  
Why does it matter that historians gain a proper orientation that comes with 
such engagement? Is it more than simply a matter of setting the record straight? In my 
view, it is: there are important implications for the politics of human rights practice in 
getting the historiography of human rights wrong. We are confronted with an issue 
that has important socio-political consequences at a time when the legitimacy of 
human rights is increasingly under challenge. Matthias Mahlmann has correctly 
argued that the implications of the debate about genealogy go beyond ‘purely 
historical curiosity about the trajectories of the history of ideas’,163 and involve deeper 
questions of both the content and legitimacy of the idea under scrutiny.  
Moyn’s narrative has potentially important implications for the legal 
interpretation of human rights. This is because ‘of the widespread assumption that a 
genealogical reconstruction will tell us something about the meaning’ of the 
concept.164 In those jurisdictions that tend towards a more ‘originalist’ approach to 
interpretation, as well as in those jurisdictions that adopt a ‘telelogical’ approach, the 
historical debate may prove influential; in the former case, because it may be thought 
to shed light on the intentions of those who were the ‘founding fathers’; in the latter 
case, because it may be thought to help us to understand what is the ‘telos’ of human 
rights. It is appropriate, therefore, to correct Moyn’s narrative, if it is not to take hold 
in legal practice.  
More importantly, how current debates on the history of human rights are 
resolved is likely to affect perceptions as to whether human rights deserve their 
special moral status in current political thought and legal practice. Moyn’s argument 
that the current human rights movement arose primarily from American engagement 
and NGO activism, filling an ideological gap left by the collapse of other ideologies, 
leaves nothing other than Great Power real politik and opportunistic transnational 
civil society enthusiasm to explain its current role. His systematic attempts to 
undermine what occurred before the 1970s, viewing them as contributing nothing of 
importance to our current understanding of human rights, risks providing important 
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intellectual cover for challenges to the legitimacy of human rights (beyond the United 
States, at least). In closing off alternative genealogies and sources, including multiple 
alternative discourses of long-standing, the common complaints of those states and 
governments who abuse their powers that human rights simply further American (or 
Western) values and encourage ‘foreign’ NGO interference in local decision-making, 
are likely to gain increased traction.  
If Moyn’s narrative were convincing then we should be prepared to accept its 
corrosive effects, however unpalatable. I have sought to argue that his narrative is not 
convincing, however, and that the multiple sources that go to make up the genealogy 
of human rights support a more complex understanding of the history of human rights. 
